Ethnographic analogy, the use of comparative data from anthropology to inform reconstructions of past human societies, has a troubled history. Archaeologists often express concern about, or outright reject, the practice-and sometimes do so in problematically general terms. This is odd, as (or so I argue) the use of comparative data in archaeology is the same pattern of reasoning as the 'comparative method' in biology, which is a well-developed and robust set of inferences which play a central role in discovering the biological past. In pointing out this continuity, I argue that there is no 'special pleading' on the part of archaeologists in this regard: biologists must overcome analogous epistemic difficulties in their use of comparative data. I then go on to emphasize the local, empirically tractable ways in which particular ethnographic analogies may be licensed.
Introduction
There are similarities between contemporary and prehistoric human behavior, and so in principle the living can inform us about the dead. This thought underwrites 'ethnographic analogy': the appeal to anthropological reports of contemporary, usually hunter-gatherer behavior, in support of archaeological hypotheses. There are similarities between living organisms and past organisms, and so in principle the extant can inform us about the extinct.
For Binford, then, analogy can 'provoke questions', but does not itself provide 'answers'.
When we see the continuities in the use of comparative biological data and comparative ethnographic data, it becomes clear that such positions are untenable. Ethnographic analogies certainly in principle have the goods to provide answers-that is, evidential support for hypotheses. Recent discussions of ethnographic analogy range from extreme caution or outright rejection (Hiscock 2007 , Rednarek 2012 , McCall 2007 , Barrocall 2011 , to more nuanced discussions (Gonzalez-Urquijo et al 2015, Ravn 2011 , Whittaker & Tushingham 2014 . My aim is to establish a view on the nuanced end: there is no outright rejection or acceptance of ethnographic analogy to be made, rather, for each case the devil is in the details.
I'll first introduce the comparative method with a paleoanthropological case study (section 2), followed by a similar introduction to ethnographic analogy (section 3). In section 4 I argue against archaeological 'special pleading', that is, there is nothing different, as a matter of epistemic principle, between the biologist, paleoanthropologist, nor archaeologist when drawing such analogies. The interesting question, then, is under what conditions such inferences are licensed.
Appropriately, then, I will discuss what is required to vindicate or damn a particular use of ethnographic analogy. In sections 4 and 5 I note that both ontic and epistemic issues can plague particular applications of comparative data. We must examine the strength and stability of our access to information, and investigate the properties of the systems we are examining: do they behave in a sufficiently regularly to support the inductions comparative data requires? I argue that even in troubling cases, where our information is poor and the systems behave irregularly, ethnographic evidence can still play an important role as one line of evidence involved in reconstructing the cultural past. I use recent work by Christine VanPool (2009) to illustrate how piece-meal, multi-leveled analyses of archaeological remains, drawing on ethnographic information, can lead to rich, well supported hypotheses.
Note that I am restricting myself to epistemic similarities and differences between archaeology and other sciences. There are important social, technological and financial differences which matter for how these sciences are practiced, but here I will focus on the patterns of reasoning involved.
Hobbits & Hippos
In this section I illustrate the comparative method with a paleoanthropological case study. H. floresiensis were a surprising addition to the hominid family tree. Around 13 individuals were found at a single site on the Indonesian island of Flores, which they inhabited up until around 14,000 years ago (Brown et al 2004 , Moorwood et al 2005 . Their most striking feature is diminutive size-adults reach a paltry 1 meter tall-earning them the inevitable 'hobbit' epithet.
In addition to their stature, they also sport 'primitive 1 ' features: low encephalization (that is, brain-size/body-size ratio), arboreal adaptations and incomplete bipedalism. H. floresiensis' taxonomic grouping is mysterious: do their features signal a remarkable story of late hominid evolutionary adaptability, or a remarkable story of early hominid radiation and survival? Are the hobbits late hominids gone dwarf, or the last remnant of a hitherto unknown migration of early hominids? These hypotheses provide contrasting explanations of H. floresiensis' traits, which illustrate an essential distinction in the comparative method.
By the 'early hominid' hypothesis, hobbits are the ancestors of a primitive hominid radiation out of Africa, perhaps Homo habilis (Jungers 2009 , Wong 2009 ). H. floresiensis and H. habilis share traits: they are small, low in encephalization, walk stooped, and suit partially arboreal lifestyles.
By this hypothesis, hobbit traits are the result of retained, ancestral features. They are homologues. Two traits are homologous when they are inherited from a common ancestor 2 Which hypothesis is more likely: are the hobbit traits inherited homologues, or homoplastic?
Were they habiline or erectine? Most obviously, this depends on whether a habiline 'ghost' radiation or an erectine dwarf with hobbit-like features is more plausible. However, there is more to this than meets the eye-let's start with the 'early hominid' hypothesis.
The 'early hominid' hypothesis involves what has been called a phylogenetic (or homologous)
inference (see Levy & Currie 2014 , Currie 2015 . In such inferences, common features are taken to be indicative of common ancestry, or common ancestry is taken to be evidence of common traits.
In this case we infer from the similarities between early hominids and H. floresiensis to their having a shared ancestry. An example of the latter would be to appeal to other facts about early hominids to infer further hobbit traits, say that H. floresiensis used the stone-flake based Olduwan tool-set on the basis of their (presumed) habiline ancestors using them. The success of such inferences turn on:
(1) How similar are the traits, and are they similar in relevant respects 5 ? Obviously, brute quantitative similarity has its part to play, but typically, biologists prefer some traits more than others. For instance, traits that are less likely to be affected by selection pressure.
Traits related to climbing, for instance, are frequently excluded from reconstructions of monkey phylogenies, as these are highly likely to be homoplastic, and thus too noisy for taxonomic purposes (see Hall 2007) .
(2) How labile are the traits? That is, over evolutionary time, should we expect the trait in question to remain stable, or change? Traits under intense and steady maintenance (or 'stabilizing') selection are likely to remain stable. Moreover, canalized 'generatively entrenched' (Wimsatt 1986 ) traits will also resist change. Others are more labile, and thus problematic. The dramatic changes in hominid brain size over our evolution suggests that 5 Remane (1952) provides five criteria for identifying homologues. Some of these stretch the notion of 'similarity' somewhat: i.e., some depend on the relative positions of the homologues rather than similarity in character states. I take being similar in 'relevant respects' to capture these non-character-state-based notions.
encephalization is labile in hominids, and this underwrites caution about inferring ancestry from that trait alone.
(3) What is the temporal distance? The amount of time between homologues matters for the stability of homologous inferences. For short distances, labile traits could remain stable, whereas over long distances only the most entrenched will.
And so, in addition to the plausibility of a habiline ghost lineage, the evidential support for the 'early hominid' hypothesis depends on the relevant similarity and lability of the traits in question. Let's move to the 'late hominid' hypothesis.
Recall that, by the 'late hominid' hypothesis, H. floresiensis were of erectine stock, but evolved shorter stature (and other traits) while adapting to the environment of Flores. As opposed to inferring across ancestry, we here appeal to a model which links particular traits to certain adaptive environments in a particular developmental context. That is, the inference relies on a model claiming that, for hominids, adaptation to island environments could plausibly lead to the hobbit's traits (Currie 2013) . The objection to the late hominid hypothesis just is that the model of island dwarfism does not do this. So, how is that model sanctioned? Weston & Lister (2009) (1) What is the phylogenetic distance between the traits? Lineages with similar developmental systems are more likely to respond similarly to selective or other environmental pressures than those with different developmental systems. Phylogenetic relatedness is a proxy for this. Martin et al, for instance, could complain that their model is only supposed to be applicable to hominid dwarfs, not Afrotheria. For this to bite, they would need to make it plausible that the two phylogenetic groups are likely to diverge in that respect 8 . 6 A broader approach is taken by Bromham & Cardillo (2007) . They test the 'island rule', that larger animals lose size and smaller animals gain size on islands, across many primates. They find that the hobbit's gross body size fits within the island rule's range.
7 See Currie's (2015) parallel discussion of 'bracketed models' for more. 8 Currie (2013) 
Stones & Shaman
Painted images on natural stone, 'rock' or 'parietial' art, are widespread human artifacts that provide enticing, but ambiguous, insights into the lifeways of those who made them. became a bridge between contemporary shamanistic practices and rock art-and thus from the art to the ancient artists themselves. And so, although the modern San do not themselves create rock art, it is thought that there is both cultural and environmental continuity between them and the ancient, rock-art producing cultures archaeologists want to understand, and that this is sufficient to justify using San shamanistic practice to inform interpretation.
Researchers now interpret specific panels in terms of well-documented symbols of potency, metaphors of trance experience, significant human and animal postures, entopic phenomena, and hallucinations experienced by San shamans. As this work proceeds, we learn more and more about the 'syntax' and 'vocabulary' of the art and are thus able to 'read' increasingly complex painted texts. Each elucidation deepens our understanding of San thought and religious experience and so provides hitherto unattainable insights into the ideology of the now-extinct painters (Lewis Williams 1989 pp166).
Detailed studies of San ethnographies, then, provide the language of shamanistic motif, which is then applied to the rock art in question. This is an example of what archaeologists call a 'direct' analogy:
Ethnographic information can also be direct, when both the archaeological and ethnographic contexts share a common geographic setting and a potential cultural connection exists between them (Berrocal 2011, pp 6 ).
An important part of the justification here is the hypothesized continuity between the contemporary San, or near-contemporary in the case of 19 th Century ethnographic reports, and the rock artists 3,000 years earlier. Further justification is provided by similarities between the rock art and shamanistic stories, roughly, the capacity of shamanistic motifs to explain otherwise baffling features of rock art (Lewis-Williams' 1989 discussion of the meaning of Elan imagery is a striking example).
As I make explicit in section 4, there are structural similarities between the direct analogy connecting the San and ancient African artists, and the homologous inference between H.
floresiensis and its habiline ancestors. Both infer, on the basis of relevant similarities, along lines of ancestry. The inferred continuity between cultural groups on the one hand, and between phylogenies on the other, both underlie the reconstruction.
And so, in South Africa, shamanism is used to explain the features of ancient rock art and is supported by the claim that San are a cultural/geographically continuous people with the rock artists. These ideas were then transplanted into Europe, where the inference took on a rather different character (note that the claims that the San can inform interpretation of South African rock art, and that the same ethnographies can inform European rock art are different, and not mutually exclusive).
In Europe, the shaman hypothesis received a neuro-psychological spin (Lewis- The suggestion that Paleolithic art is explicable via analogy with the San is similar to the hypothesized relationship between H. floresiensis and other island dwarfs. In both cases, the target is taken to be a token of a type: the former is an instance of shamanistic motif, the latter an instance of island dwarfism. Seen in this light, the regularities applying to these instances (the meaning of entropic motifs, or the developmental models of dwarfism) are applicable to the targets.
The use of ethnographies to inform rock art interpretation has been heavily criticized, both in its direct and indirect application. These objections are examples of the more general charges I discuss in section 4. Rednarik (2012) puts this all rather starkly:
…I am most pessimistic about our prospects in most of these areas, and in particular, I
perceive very little scientific benefit in most traditional [ethnographic] (Bahn 1997 , Solomon 1998 In seeking to interpret rock art using universal features of cosmology and religious practice, it is highly generalizing. It denies the importance of regional historical and social contexts in determining symbolic practices. In seeking singular meanings for inherently polysemous symbols, it clearly lacks the kind of multivocality that has become a key feature of post-processual approaches (226).
Roughly, according to McCall, if hunter-gatherer religious practices are deeply disunified and heterogeneous, then similarities between their material remains are no guide to similarities in their cultural practices.
A third, and related, worry is about interpretation. The shift from rock art to cultural practice relies on inferring the art's meaning-and meaning is tricky. As Smith puts it:
Perhaps the greatest difficulty in getting at the meaning of prehistoric art is that we do not know the symbolic conceptions which were involved even in naturalistic representations. Are these to be taken literally, that is as signs? Or are they loaded symbols, part of a code to be broken? (1968, p.30) .
Human-made symbols admit many possible meanings-and getting an epistemic grip on these meanings is difficult. If there is no way for us to narrow the space of possible hypotheses, then we could be stuck at an empirical dead-end.
Note that the scope of these objections is unclear. Are archaeologists merely sounding a note of caution about the use of shamanistic ethnographies, are they claiming that such inferences are invalid in these particular circumstances, or are these applications of more general, in principle, arguments ethnographic analogy? Both direct and indirect analogies have come under three kinds of fire: the trustworthiness of the source, the idea that 'shamanism' is a good category, and the issue of interpretation. On the face of it, these objections tend towards the general rather than the specific-there are overarching reasons to worry about ethnographic analogies which undermine particular uses. It is my task in the next two sections to shift such objections to the specific. As we shall see, if shamanistic analogies are problematic (or, for that matter, kosher), this needs to be shown via a detailed examination of the particular circumstance.
Special Pleading?
In this section I examine archaeological objections to ethnographic analogies in terms of the comparative method. Both homoplastic inferences and indirect ethnographic analogies work by supporting models linking features within certain constraints, that is, they are conceived on the type-level. Their plausibility is based on how likely the constraints are-that is, how similar ought we expect the critters in that group to be, how many independent data points there are for the model, and the level and type of similarity.
In terms of brute evidential reasoning, then, an ethnographic analogy is simply an example of the comparative method applied to archaeology. This is, I think, unsurprising: after all, Wylie (1985) has shown that ethnographic analogy can be understood in terms of the logic of analogous reasoning in general, and moreover I have operated at such a coarse grain of analysis that it is easy to unify things. However, I think important upshots emerge from this point. With a link established between archaeology and biology, we can re-examine and reconceptualise general objections to ethnographic analogy. By doing so, I show that such general objections are misplaced, and point to which details would help us ascertain the licence of a particular inference.
Interpretation
Archaeologists study the remains of incredibly complex critters who arrange themselves into very complex systems-societies-and one of the tricky things about these critters is their intentions: humans have goals, aims and reasons. This means that if material remains are to be inroads to past human lifeways, they need to be interpreted. But interpretation is difficult because human intention is so diverse. Yes, the Elan is a central motif in San shamanistic practices, representing the power of the entranced shaman, but why should I think this is true of And so, the claim that ethnographic analogies are particularly prone to underdetermination could be driven by the thought that (1) good ethnographies would be great evidence, but they just aren't available (evidential underdetermination), or (2) we just don't have the theories required to link ethnographies to past human societies (midrange underdetermination).
Interestingly, these options are intimately linked to the next two challenges I am to discuss. The first is about how good our evidence about ethnographies is, the second is about the kinds of systems human societies might be and how this affects the relevance of ethnographic data. If I am right, then complaints about interpretation actually either boil down to worries about uniformitarian principles-human societies are just the wrong kinds of systems; or worries about sufficiency of evidence. Let's turn to those issues.
Uniformitarianism
There are a wide variety of uniformitarian principles. Basically, they tell us that a phenomena, force, or regularity from some domain also operates in another. In a sense, Newton's arguments for universal gravitation-that the mathematics representing forces on pulleys and weights also represented the relationships between celestial bodies-was uniformitarian. Typically, though, the term is related to 19 th Century geologists such as Lyell, who argued that we ought to use the kind of small-scale geological processes we see now (erosion, for instance) to explain geological form-a slow and steady approach to explanation which heavily influenced Darwin. Some kind of uniformitarian principle is necessary to license ethnographic analogy, but it is very important to get clear on what type.
Some complaints against ethnographic analogy assume that they require a kind of general uniformitarianism. Holly Hayter is a good example, she argues that:
There are a number of problems involved in the use of ethnographic analogy. Basically, these problems lie in the various underlying uniformitarian, environmental-deterministic notions upon which the notion of analogy is based. (47-48).
In other words, analogies require uniformitarian-that is, deterministic-connections between environments and human culture. But there aren't deterministic connections between environments and human culture, again quoting Hayter:
…ethnographic studies have only proved that there are an incredible amount of different codes of behavior practiced by many groups throughout the world. There are insurmountable factors involved in structuring human behavior: no one practice can be narrowed down to environmental, social, or biological factors. There are no such things as cultural laws… (44-45).
Human cultural groups, then, are too complex for simple deterministic inferences from environment to culture to hold-human systems are path-dependent, interdependent, and highly context-sensitive. In virtue of this, such systems are not amenable to strict uniformitarian treatments. Hayter is right about this. Moreover, as we saw earlier, she and other archaeologists might also be right to put pressure on the notion that 'shaman' or 'hunter-gatherer' are good categories. They may be gerrymandered collections of disparate cultural and subsistence practices. However, there are two fundamental errors here: first, in thinking that ethnographic analogies (direct or indirect) require deterministic connections between environment and culture; second, that they require robust categories like 'hunter-gatherer'. To see why, let's reexamine the relationship between hobbits and hippos.
The homologous inference from H. floresiensis's traits to a habiline ancestry relied on an uniformitarian principle: we could call this 'phylogenetic inertia' (Griffiths 1996 , Levy & Currie 2015 . Phylogenetic inertia, taken generally, says that traits are likely to remain stable over time; it provides a general license to think biological traits are not (very) labile. Such a principle could be motivated by evolutionary theory. In order for complex traits to cumulatively evolve, avenues of inheritance must be fairly robust, and so we should expect inertia. Hopefully it is immediately obvious that this principle is more applicable for some traits than others, as inheritance channels differ in their robustness. This is why investigating the lability of a trait matters. Phylogenetic inertia, then, is no deterministic principle. The use of pygmy hippos to test the model of insular dwarfism in H. floresiensis also didn't require that there be any deterministic relationships: things are more subtle than that. It produced evidence that the model of insular dwarfism applied to the hobbits was faulty.
And so, analogous evidence in no way requires commitment to strong deterministic principles-but, as we shall see in 5.2, working out how robust the relevant inheritance channels are (in the direct case) and how determinate the material-remain/cultural regularities are (in the indirect case) is extremely important for licencing an ethnographic analogy.
Moreover, using ethnographic analogies does not require robust unified categories like 'hunter-gatherer'. Remember, an ethnographic analogy links a material remain with a cultural product (or a cultural product with another) either through a model, or along lines of ancestry. In neither case do we need the categories to be unified in a deep way. Hippopotamus and Hominids are very different kinds of critters. We do not need for them to fall within some general category for their use in a homoplastic inference: they just need to be similar in the relevant respects. Even if there are enormous differences between so-called 'hunter-gatherer' groups, what matters for ethnographic analogy is the robustness of the relevant similarities.
The lesson here is that uniformitarian principles are applicable case-by-base. Some systems act in a relatively regular way. These systems (at least in regards to the way they are regular) are well behaved and uniformitarian. Others are more chaotic and such principles do not hold. Of course systems can be systematically chaotic: there is a whole range of ways in which regularities can hold across systems! And note that these features of systems are empirically investigable, at least in principle.
So, if there is any special pleading on the part of archaeology about reliance on uniformitarian principles, this would require an argument that archaeological targets are more chaotic, irregular and labile than biological (or paleoanthropological) ones; there is no in-principle difference.
Ethnographies are suspect
Archaeologists have justifiable concerns about ethnographic data. Many are reports compiled by untrustworthy narrators-as Hiscock (2007) This is a different complaint than that of the last section. There, we were concerned about whether our target system admitted of analogous treatments. Here, we are concerned about whether the evidence we have about that system is kosher. The first worry was, given some good ethnographic data, is that data relevant to our archaeological target. This second worry is whether the ethnographic data is good in the first place.
Historical scientists frequently work under conditions of apparent evidential paucity: it is not merely archaeological remains which are biased, ambiguous and fragmentary. Studies of H. floresiensis are marked by degraded, incomplete-and few-specimen. There are the remains of 13 incomplete hobbit skeletons, and this is a fairly rich find by the standards of paleoanthropology. In order for there to be special pleading, it must be that ethnographic data is highly biased, ambiguous and fragmentary. There could be something to this: although fossil remains of pygmy hippopotamus are incomplete, the hippos will not actively mislead you. In 5.1, I
will defend the use of such data in reconstructing the past.
My aim thus far has been to clarify: just what challenges ethnographic analogies face, and what would it take for these challenges to be particular to archaeology. As we have seen, there are no epistemic issues unique to archaeological comparative data. Moreover, the license depends on facts on the ground. I want to shift to a more normative frame of mind in the last section. Here, I will discuss what archaeologists can (and sometimes in fact are) doing about these apparent problems.
Local Licence and Comparative Data in Archaeology
In the last section, I argued that concerns about ethnographic analogies boil down to two concerns: issues about evidence, its trustworthiness and stability, and issues about the regularity of human cultural behavior and systems. These must be understood to ascertain the evidential weight of an ethnographic analogy. Here, I will point to how historical scientists generally overcome these problems, and point to where they may, indeed, be problematic.
Evidence & Culture
There are many ways in which historical evidence can be problematic. Downstream traces can degrade and so be incomplete. We can lack the required theory to link evidence to the past.
Evidence can be biased. For ethnographic analogies, the worry is that the ethnographies themselves do not truly reflect human societies. And surely, some of the time, they do not, or do so incompletely. I want to make two, perhaps obvious, points about such situations. The first concerns methodology, and simply recommends collecting ethnographies that are not only better organized, but targeted. The second concerns the epistemic role ethnographic analogies play in archaeology.
Archaeologists have begun collecting their own, and testing, ethnographic data-and this is an obvious response to worries about ethnographic evidence. I want to point out a few things about this practice. Recall that indirect analogies (and surely most of these archaeological ethnographic studies will be indirect-there are so few groups with direct connections remaining!) rely upon models that connect features of human life. Like in the biological case, these are ceteris paribus on two counts. First, they are not intended to hold across all cases.
Martin et al's model is only intended to hold across mammals-there is no discussion of how dwarfism is developmentally expressed in birds or fish, for instance. Second, they allow exceptions-such models are only intended to hold across typical specimen (see Currie 2015) .
This caveating is necessary for biologists because of the 'historicity' of biology
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-that is, biological systems are highly path dependent (natural selection, after all, can only work with what it has). This path dependence means that many regularities across biological systems will be highly constrained to particular ancestral groups-regularities, when they occur, will do so within shared histories. Potentially, human cultural groups could exhibit historicity writ large-they could be highly contingent, and admitting only of localized evidential treatment. But this needs to be shown. Showing that, for instance, there is no monolithic 'hunter-gatherer' culture does not show that there are no exploitable regularities across human groups.
And so, for direct analogies, we need to know how stable we should expect human culture to be. In some cases, not very: given the shear plasticity of human behavior and culture, I worry that direct analogies are often not useful. Homologous inferences gain their epistemic warrant, not only from similarity, but because, for many biological traits, we expect robust inheritance channels. We expect this because natural selection requires such channels to build complex morphologies, and because developmental systems ensure it. Does something like this hold for human culture? Pessimism on this question may be too quick: human groups maintain channels of cultural inheritance by constructing 'epistemic niches' which ensure uptake of the right skills and beliefs across generations (Sterelny 2003) . It may turn out that some aspects of cultural inheritance, particularly when buttressed by high fidelity channels (for instance, those maintained by song, story and ritual), are extremely robust. Regardless to say, I would like to see more study of which aspects of human life are stable over time, and which are not.
Here is one example of how we might empirically investigate the trustworthiness of ethnographies, and the robustness of cultural inheritance. Bernardini (2008) reports that Hopi informants are not only able to identify grave goods from a thousand year's old grave site, but also successfully predicated other objects found in the same assemblage. This doesn't show that continuity between the Hopi and the makers of the grave site is doing the work, of course (for instance, they could just be very familiar with such sites), but nonetheless presents an interesting example of how to test ethnographic reliability 12 .
For indirect analogies, we want to know how stable we should expect correspondences between environment and cultural traits to be. This, oddly enough, I have more optimism about:
these correspondences needn't be determinate, they needn't be exceptionless. They just need to provide evidence. Given how adaptive and flexible human groups are, where there are good cultural solutions to problems, we should expect these to crop up often. Overall, then, collecting ethnographic data is important for answering such questions, and targeted investigations are called for. 12 Thanks to Michelle Turner for the example.
The lesson here is that whether we have good ethnographic evidence is an empirically tractable question. Archaeologists can study and generate ethnographic material in a way which leads to better understanding, and their applicability to reconstructions of past cultures.
The main problem, I think, with focusing on the evidential shortfalls of ethnographic analogies and then concluding that their use is non-evidential, is the nature of confirmation in historical science. Even if ethnographic analogy is weak evidence, historical science is all about drawing together different strands of weak evidence to build a surprisingly strong whole. Several philosophers have emphasized the importance of independent streams of evidence in the support of historical science, and it is worth summarizing that work here.
Alison Wylie (2002 Wylie ( , 2011 distinguishes between two forms of independence. Vertical independence concerns the relationship between theories which play different roles. Horizontal independence concerns different types of evidence, converging on the same hypothesis. I will focus on horizontal independence.
Of necessity, evidential reasoning depends on multiple strands of arguments: it emanates from disparate elements of the archaeological record, draws on background knowledge that originates in diverse source fields, and bears on an array of conditions and events that constitute the complicated lives of the material things that make up the archaeological record (Wylie 2011 pp386-387) .
Horizontal independence concerns evidence-streams playing the same role (i.e supporting the same hypothesis) from disparate sources. This is seen in the application of different dating techniques:
Consider, for example, evidential arguments that turn on the juxtaposition of measures of radiocarbon decay, magnetic orientation, tree ring counts, and stylistic variability over time (Ibid, 387) .
These different measures are independent, and data-convergence reassures us of their veracity. Forber & Griffith (2011) make the same point, arguing that historical hypotheses are largely justified on these terms. They focus on dating using 14 C and tree-ring counting:
Whatever the insecurities inherent in each line of evidence, their congruence raises the credibility of the claims they support insofar as the conditions or assumptions that might produce error in a 14 C date are not the same as those that might bias a date based on tree ring sequences of rates of stylistic change (387-388).
According to Forber & Griffith, the ability of historical scientists to draw on independent lines of evidence undercuts underdetermination problems. As evidence-lines converge, the total evidence for a past event increases. The rationale is that different factors are required to confound the different measurements. It would be highly unlikely for both 14 C data and tree ring data to screw up at the same time; and it is more unlikely still for their results to converge in spite of this. When horizontally independent lines of evidence converge, the hypothesis that both measurements are correct is much more likely than the hypothesis that both are false. This kind of reasoning applies to analogies as well: see my (2013) discussion of 'integrated explanations', which discusses explicitly how analogous and non-analogous information can aid in reconstruction.
The point of all this is to show that historical hypotheses can, in terms of evidential support, be more than the sum of their parts. If that is right, then it is a mistake to discount a line of evidence, particularly one as potentially important as ethnographies, because the evidence is somewhat problematic. Of course, it would be equally foolhardy to prioritize that evidence without good reason. Even if ethnographic information is sketchy, it can nonetheless provide an important line of evidence to support archaeological hypotheses.
Cultural Reconstruction
nature of human cultural systems. The objection that there is no unified, discrete 'shaman' category is one, and a related complaint is the apparent commitment to uniformitarian principles. First, VanPool, drawing from anthropological surveys, agrees that 'Shaman' is not a discrete category: 'shamanistic' practices, individualized, idiosyncratic, and involving trance-states, grade into more organized 'priestly' practices in a non-systematic way. This is no block to the class being useful however, VanPool recommends taking shamanism to be a 'polythetic' class "… in which members share many, but not all of the defining characteristics" (179). This class shades into the polythetic class of priests:
As intuitive as it may seem, however, shamans and priests are not appropriate archetypes and do not reflect dichotomous or essentialist "types" in the sense that they are immutable states wholly distinct from one another. Instead they are analytically useful groupings that reflect the co-occurrence of religious traits that tend to correspond with one another as the level of cultural complexity shifts (178).
Second, VanPool analyses various features of Shamanism, and identifies which features of shamanistic systems are more likely to be universal, and those which are more particular. For instance, Shamans achieve altered states of consciousness through a variety of methods:
psychoactive drugs, chant and ritual, sensory deprivation, and so forth. There are regularities about how these methods affect human perception, and these can make a difference to the material remains of shamanistic practices. To take one of VanPool's examples, nicotine intoxication effects color perception, excluding the palate to white, yellow and black, while peyote produces vivid 'psychedelic' experiences. These colors are reflected in shamanistic art associated with those drugs. However, although the perceptual experiences generated by different methods of achieving altered states are general, how these are understood is culturally variable.
Both entopic images and hallucinations are universal, but their utilization and interpretation by shamans… are culturally specific… Understanding the cultural filter used to interpret the hallucinations encountered during SSC should be central to the anthropology of religion, given that it reflects cultural transmission between the practitioners, aspects of a culture's cosmology, and their view of the spirit world (180).
Third, VanPool documents various material remains ('sacra') which are associated with shamanistic practices. These include imagery, including rock art, musical instruments, the remains of psychoactive plants, the tools associated with them (pipes for instance) and spaces put aside for shamanistic activities. VanPool emphasizes the importance of utilizing these material remains as independent lines of evidence for identifying shamanistic practices. For instance, … most shamanistic rituals include some form of hallucinogenic agent. Shamanistic sacra will therefore be indicated by its association with the agents themselves (e.g., macrobotanical remains of datura) and the tools used to administer them (e.g., pipes for smoking tobacco). This can be compared with the imagery (e.g., colour symbolism, types of images depicted) to determine if they correspond with one another (183).
In short, it is a mistake to take archaeological evidence atomistically-rather, hypotheses need to be considered as a whole and the dependencies between different lines of evidence need to be considered. An assemblage consisting of botanical tobacco remains and pipes, as well as white, yellow and black imagery, points clearly towards tobacco-based shamanistic practices. This is because the assemblage would be less likely without the presence of shamanism.
VanPool uses ethnographic data to inform her reconstructions even though (1) the category 'shaman' is not discrete, (2) the anthropological data is sketchy, (3) human societies are complex and labile. She is able to do this by analyzing the ethnographic data in a fine-grained manner, allowing her to identify which features are likely to be common and which will be culturally specific, as well as by integrating the ethnographic data with analyses of material remains, the color-palate of rock artists, and psychological details of human perception. In VanPool's work, we see ethnographic analogy take its proper place as just one of our sources of information about the past. Understanding its limitations and integrating it with other sources is the secret to making ethnographic information relevant to archaeological reconstruction.
Conclusion
I have argued that ethnographic analogy just is the application of the comparative method to human culture and material remains. On this basis, I have revisited the objections archaeologists have raised to the use of analogy. I argued that all-encompasing rejection (or acceptance!) of ethnographic analogies should themselves be rejected. The action is local. Moreover, even when analogies are carried out on the basis of incomplete, biased ethnographies, and even when the target systems are highly sensitive to context and exhibit 'historicity', ethnographic data can play an important role in supporting archaeological hypotheses. They count as one line of evidence which archaeologists can exploit. Is there, then, cause for special pleading among archaeologists-are there systematic differences between archaeological method, or archaeological targets, and their biological analogues? No. In either case, the applicability of both inferences along inheritance channels, and models which exploit regularities, is piece-meal and
